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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

privilege, the state was strictly liable for inverse condemnation and tort
damages. Affirming the trial court's decision, the court found that if
not compensated, Arreola would contribute more than his proper
share to the public undertaking of highway construction.
Moreover, the court found the state had a duty to avoid
obstructing the floodplain, and the state violated that duty. It used
foreseeability to determine duty, and found facts supporting the
conclusion that the highway's obstruction of floodwater was not only
foreseeable, but was foreseen. The state was aware of reports from the
Corps that a hundred-year storm could generate 43,500 c.f.s. and
overwhelm the project. Additionally, it was also aware the culverts
could not handle the resulting flood.
Since the damage was
foreseeable and foreseen, the state had a duty to avoid the damage,
and breached that duty when it built the highway to inferior standards.
The court continued its analysis by holding that Government Code
section 830.6 was not a defense for the state. In order to have
immunity under section 830.6, the state needed to show that its design
was reasonable. The court found that state's design of the highway
with ninety-eight c.f.s. culverts was unreasonable given the state's
awareness that a hundred-year flood could generate up to 43,500 c.f.s.,
far over the project's capacity.
The court finished its analysis by denying the state's argument that
failure of the project was a superseding cause. The court reasoned in
order for cause to be superseding, it must be unforeseeable. In this
case, the failure of the project was not only foreseeable, but also
foreseen. Therefore failure of the project could not be a superseding
cause.
James Parrot

California v. Murrison, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that notification to the Department of the Fish and Game is
required where a diversion of water occurs).
Scott Edgar Murrison ("Murrison") placed rocks and gravel across
Big Creek, a small creek in Trinity County, to divert ninety-five percent
of the water flow from the creek to a diversion ditch. The Fish and
Game Code ("Code") stated that it was unlawful for any person to
substantially divert or obstruct the natural flow or substantially change
the bed, channel, or bank of any river, stream, or lake without first
notifying the Department of the Fish and Game ("DFG") of the
activity. The State of California brought suit against Murrison for
violation of the Code. The Superior Court of Trinity County found
that Murrison substantially altered the creek without complying with
the Code, enjoining Murrison from further diversion, and assessing
civil penalties. Murrison appealed to the Court of Appeals of
California, claiming his water right could not be limited by the Code,
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the government could not take his water rights without compensation,
the injunction against him was too broad, and civil penalties should
not have been assessed. The court affirmed.
Murrison's water rights dated back to 1870-1912. He argued that
his water right predated the Code and was therefore exempt from its
requirements. The court of appeals found, however, that water rights
predating the Code are not exempt from regulation. It is within the
state's police power to create reasonable regulations to protect the
wildlife of the state.
Murrison argued he was not diverting new water but rather
maintaining his waterworks and was exempt from the Code. The court
found that Murrison's action was not maintenance, but rather a
substantial diversion that required DFG notification.
Murrison also argued that the state could not take his water right
without just compensation. The court found that Murrison's takings
claim was not ripe. Murrison did not bring a takings claim at the trial
court level and was not restricted from making the claim on appeal.
The court stated, however, that they found no restrictions on
Murrison's right to divert water. Murrison was only required to notify
the DFG of his diversion. Had Murrison given notice, the DFG may
have approved the diversion without any restrictions.
Murrison claimed the trial court should not have assessed a civil
penalty. The court found the Code allows penalties in excess of what
Murrison received and justified the penalty based on Murrison's
actions coupled with the nature of the diversion and damages.
Colleen M. Cooley
Hartwell Corp. v. Santamaria, 38 P.3d 1098 (Cal. 2002) (holding
public utility commission's jurisdiction does not extend to suits against
non-regulated utilities and industries, nor to suits alleging violations of
state and federal water-quality standards).
Multiple consumers brought actions in two superior courts against
regulated water providers ("RWPs"), non-regulated water providers
("NRWPs"), and multiple industrial companies for damages and
injunctive relief from alleged water contamination.
The parties
claimed that the water utilities provided them unsafe drinking water
causing death, personal injury, and property damage. The California
Court of Appeals held one of the two superior courts erred: (1) in
staying the proceedings instead of ruling on the merits; (2) by failing
to grant the RWPs' Public Utilities Code section 1759 motion to
dismiss; and (3) by failing to deny the industrial companies' and the
NRWPs' section 1759 motions to dismiss. The appeals court also held
the second superior court was correct in granting the RWPs' motion to
dismiss and denying the NRWPs' and the industrial companies'
motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court of California granted

